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CAUGHT IN THE CROSS FIRE: 
AFRICAN AMERICANS AND 
FLORIDA’S SYSTEM OF LABOR 
DURING WORLD WAR II 
 
By JAMES A. SCHNUR 
 
 
The Second World War greatly altered 
Florida’s social climate. The trends of 
tourism, business progressivism, ur-
banization, and industrial development that 
evolved during the war and flourished in its 
aftermath competed with conventional 
agricultural and extractive enterprises. 
Countless soldiers served on Florida’s 
military bases, and many returned after the 
war in search of jobs and greater economic 
mobility. Women answered the call to fill 
vacancies in wartime industries. The state’s 
African American residents, however, were 
caught in the cross fire between the 
immediate labor demands of a nation 
transformed by war and the long-standing 
traditions of segregation and paternalism 
that had historically stifled their economic 
welfare. When the Pittsburgh Courier 
announced its "Double V" campaign two 
months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, it 
encouraged blacks throughout America to 
fight for victory in two distinct wars: the 
external struggle against Fascism and the 
internal culture of racism. This essay 
examines the precarious balance between 
labor and race relations in Florida during 
World War II.1 
 
Despite their loyalty and patriotism, blacks 
in Florida encountered blatant 
discrimination and paternalistic race 
relations in the years prior to World War II. 
A story in a 1917 issue of the Tampa 
Morning Tribune claimed that German 
agents hoped to incite blacks to rebel by 
promising them "complete franchise, 
freedom, and political and social equality." 
Guards closely monitored activities in the 
Scrub and other black areas of the Cigar 
City. In June 1918, the mayor of Miami 
ordered police to prohibit any gathering of 
blacks in Colored Town because he feared 
such an assembly might become rowdy and 
unmanageable. Police abuse, coupled with 
other forms of institutional bigotry and a 
revived Ku Klux Klan, haunted blacks 
throughout Florida long after hostilities 
concluded on Armistice Day in 1918. The 
Klan reemerged in Florida during the early 
1920s and promptly became immersed in the 
political hierarchy. Wherever klaverns 
appeared, violence soon followed. In this 
paternal culture, many of the white 
Floridians who rewarded blacks for 
deferential behavior would evoke terror to 
maintain their social and economic 
hegemony. Similar to abusive parents who 
excessively punish their children, Southern 
whites considered it their duty to discipline 
blacks for any infringement of customs and 
traditions. Blacks who challenged the 
division of labor that relegated them to 
low-wage, low-skilled jobs often endured 
acts of public humiliation, beatings, and, 
occasionally, murder.2 
 
Florida’s unbalanced scales of justice 
promoted a system of statutory bondage. In 
the years following the Civil War, 
authorities maintained a supply of cheap 
labor by instituting a convict lease program 
and enforcing debt peonage regulations. 
Blacks constituted a majority of the convicts 
leased from Florida’s prisons to work for 
private companies. Though the state 
officially ended this exploitative program in 
1923, the custom of leasing prisoners 
persisted into the 1940s. A law enacted 
during the 1919 legislative session 
considered it “prima facie evidence of the 
intent to defraud" if individuals accepted 
any item of value -- such as transportation to 
a labor camp -- but refused to fulfill their 
obligations. White recruiters could mislead 
desperate and impoverished African 
Americans by promising them free 
transportation, food, and accommodations if 
they worked in the forests or plantations. In 
this modern form of indentured servitude, 
once new employees arrived at the labor 
camps, the\ witnessed deplorable conditions 
and realized that they owed the company for 
their passage. The law offered no recourse 
for the duped black laborers because it 
required them to prove that the employer 
had misled them: Florida courts would never 
permit blacks to make such accusations 
against the white businessmen who 
bolstered the state's economy with captive 
labor.3 
 
Turpentine camps egregiously violated the 
civil rights of black workers. Camp 
authorities colluded with sheriffs, 
politicians, and civic leaders to keep African 
Americans in a state of peonage. Beatings, 
attacks, and murders frequently occurred 
within the guarded confines of these camps. 
Some rural law enforcement officers 
arrested innocent people on vagrancy 
charges to meet quotas established by 
turpentine operators. Similar to the purchase 
of a slave in the antebellum period, camp 
administrators could secure additional 
workers by assuming the accounts of 
indebted blacks from other camps. The 
government made no attempt to halt this 
practice, even after the U. S. Department of 
Justice and a committee assembled by Gov-
ernor Doyle E. Carlton conducted 
investigations during the early 1930s. In the 
fall of 1936, newspapers throughout 
America reported that 400 blacks remained 
enslaved on a farm in Macclenny. One man 
remarked that "it would be easier for an 
enemy of Hitler to operate in Germany than 
for a union organizer to attempt to set foot in 
one of these camps." By the end of the 
decade, Governor Fred P. Cone denied that 
forced labor existed in Florida. When some-
one once asked Cone about the 1919 codes 
that reconstituted slavery, he replied: "It's a 
good law. Peonage?  We have no peonage in 
Florida. Our colored people are the happiest 
folk on earth-when the Yankees'll (w) let 
them alone." Debt peonage served as an 
important investment for Cone and the state 
of Florida. Authorities usually managed to 
capture laborers who escaped from the 
plantation, and judges placed the escapees 
on chain gangs and forced them to build 
Florida's roads and infrastructure.4 
 
Despite federal intervention, peonage at 
turpentine camps continued throughout the 
war years. A turpentine foreman told 
folklorist Stetson Kennedy during a 1941 
camp visit that his authority allowed him to 
act as "the law, judge, jury, and 
executioner.... even rank(ing) ahead of 
God." These plantations-often owned by 
Northern business interests -- used their 
Southern brand of justice on any unwelcome 
interloper: Authorities even charged Federal 
Bureau of Investigation agents with criminal 
trespass for trying to investigate conditions 
at these camps. In 1945, a Marianna 
turpentine operator falsely arrested and 
forcibly transported across the state a black 
man who owed him money. A similar case 
of bondage prompted the U. S. Supreme 
Court decision that annulled the peonage 
statute. Emanuel Pollock received $5 after 
he agreed to pay off a loan by performing 
acts of labor. When Pollock failed to keep 
his promise, the judge levied a $100 fine and 
imprisoned him. 
 
In Pollock v. Williams the Supreme Court 
declared Florida’s 1919 law unconstitutional 
because it violated the Thirteenth 
Amendment and federal anti-peonage 
statutes. But this 1944 verdict failed to curb 
de facto peonage. In 1949, the Workers’ 
Defense League (WDL) claimed that 14 
more forms of forced labor arc more widely 
practiced in Florida than in any other state. 
Its legislature by successive enactments has 
most consistently attempted to evade or 
ignore United States Supreme Court 
decisions." During a visit to Alachua County 
in 1949, the WDL located fourteen 
turpentine camps which flagrantly violated 
workers’ civil rights.5 
 
Atrocities also occurred on sugar plantations 
around Lake Okeechobee. The United States 
Sugar Corporation (US Sugar) harvested its 
first Successful crop near the Everglades in 
1931. For the next eleven years, white 
agents recruited Southern blacks to cut cane 
by offering the false assurance that the 
company would provide free housing, food, 
medical care, and transportation. When 
America’s entry into World War II seemed 
inevitable, the sugar industry cloaked its 
exploitation under the guise of patriotism. 
Recruiters for U. S. Sugar and other firms 
told prospective laborers that they worked 
for the government and tried to convince 
blacks that cane cutters served an important 
role in national defense. Once again, 
plantation managers conspired with 
government officials to enslave African 
Americans. Local constables did nothing to 
prevent farm supervisors from attacking 
their workers with guns, blackjacks, or 
machetes. Ironically, one black newspaper 
that documented peonage cases throughout 
the South printed an article informing 
readers that the sugar industry needed 500 
laborers during the upcoming season. This 
story in an August 1942 edition of the 
Atlanta Daily World mentioned the same 
"free" benefits that white recruiters had 
promised to unsuspecting black men on 
street corners.  The paper asked interested 
persons to contact the U. S. Employment 
Service, an agency that enlisted cane cutters 
for sugar corporations. The Employment 
Service claimed it assumed no responsibility 
for the welfare of the workers once they 
entered the plantation.6 
 
The sugar industry modified its hiring 
practices by 1943. A year earlier, U. S. 
Attorney General Herbert S. Phillips had 
zealously prosecuted U. S. Sugar. Although 
the court revoked a grand jury indictment 
that claimed U. S. Sugar forced field hands 
to toll under peonage, sugar corporations 
decided to halt the recruitment of blacks 
with United States citizenship to prevent 
further litigation. Beginning in 1943, 
Caribbean residents of African descent 
replaced the black Americans who found 
employment opportunities in other areas 
during World War II. This non-native black 
population posed new difficulties for a 
region that staunchly adhered to segregation: 
The government detained and deported 
many immigrants who challenged the 
discrimination found in the plantation 
system. In an October 1943 incident, staff at 
U. S. Departments of State, Agriculture, and 
Labor attempted to suppress public 
knowledge of the incarceration of nearly 900 
Jamaicans. When the islanders refused to 
sign a Jim Crow agreement given to them by 
Jamaican and American officials, authorities 
notified the immigration office and 
transferred them to jails in Tampa and 
Miami, as well as the penitentiary at 
Raiford. An official dispatched from the 
War Food Administration the following year 
discovered 25,000 West Indian recruits 
seething in near rebellion and heard that 
peace officers had arrested thousands of 
other Caribbean natives upon their arrival. 
Slavery continued, only the birthplace of the 
victims had changed.7 
 
Long before Jamaicans replaced 
Afro-Americans on sugar plantations, whites 
had erected barriers to fetter economic 
mobility among blacks. New Deal programs 
often excluded blacks: While over 850 white 
Floridians participated in the Civilian 
Conservation Corps in 1935, coercion by 
state and local officials limited the black 
enrollment to less then twenty. Similarly, 
few African Americans profited from 
National Youth Administration work-study 
programs because Southern blacks could not 
enroll in white technical schools. As 
America prepared for war, whites hoped to 
forestall an exodus of blacks from Southern 
farms to Northern industries.8  On editorial 
urged blacks in Seminole County to "think 
twice" before leaving because: 
 
(S)outhern darkies who have migrated 
(N)orth have lived to regret it... Only those 
with exceptional talents, or who manage 
somehow to keep one jump ahead of the law 
for a short time, ever find living conditions 
better off in the (N)orth ... The average 
(N)egro is far better off in the (S)outh where 
he is among friends who understand him and 
his problems and where the climate is much 
more suited to his nature.9 
 
Whites denied black farmers membership in 
many agricultural organizations, even 
though they demanded that blacks contribute 
more than their share to sustain wartime 
needs. By 1942, the St. Lucie Defense 
Council encouraged blacks to enroll in a 
labor pool that would assure the harvest of 
tomato and fruit crops. The council planned 
to submit the list to St. Lucie County 
authorities for verification, and also offer it 
to employers in need of laborers.10 
 
"Work-or-fight" mandates prolonged black 
peronage. In a sense, "wage slavers" could 
keep blacks in a subordinate role by 
regulating the status and location of their 
employment. If black workers protested too 
loudly, authorities might threaten to invoke 
the Selective Service Act. Throughout 
Florida, law enforcement officers broadly 
interpreted vagrancy laws while patrolling in 
black neighborhoods to meet the demand for 
labor on the home front. Beginning in 1942, 
St. Petersburg police mustered able-bodied 
men from black establishments. Police 
officers and city councilmen coordinated 
raids exclusively in the African American 
community to coincide with the menial and 
agricultural labor needs of local business 
interests. The following year, a Key West 
Judge vowed to investigate residents who 
terminated their employment in Monroe 
County without a good reason and arrest 
them for vagrancy. While citrus workers in 
some central Florida groves faced fines and 
jail terms for not appearing in the fields on 
Saturday, a Clearwater man served a ten-day 
sentence for missing one day of work. 
 
By January 1945, Governor Millard E 
Caldwell asked all sheriffs to eliminate 
indolence. The Martin County sheriff 
promptly seized this opportunity to warn 
loafers that: "It is going to be the policy of 
this office to cooperate with farmers, 
saw-mill men, and others doing essential 
work-to see that they get all the help 
available." A month later, Hillsborough 
County’s community war production 
committee planned a drive to combat 
"idlers" in the city of Tampa. White 
newspapers also supported the governor’s 
request when they waged an editorial war 
against loafing. The press exhorted 
community leaders to confine "Indolent" 
blacks, cure any venereal diseases they may 
possess, and haul them before local draft 
boards.11 
 
State officials sought to supervise the 
behavior of African Americans through 
economic and social coercion. By 
considering themselves the final arbiters of 
proper moral behavior, politicians, 
bureaucrats, law enforcement officers, and 
members of the State Defense Council 
assailed jook joints, social diseases, and 
other influences that might "sabotage" the 
war effort. As early as August 1942, 
Governor Spessard Holland and the state 
Board of Health negotiated with the federal 
government to secure land for detention 
camps to house diseased prostitutes. The 
state planned to offer defense training to 
women confined in these former Civilian 
Conservation Corps camps, and assign them 
to war industries upon their release. 
Officials at the U. S. Public Health Service, 
claiming the Florida possessed the highest 
venereal disease rate in the nation, asked 
policemen to corral "professional disease 
spreaders." Local authorities seized this 
initiative. Under the orders of Mayor John 
Alsop, Jacksonville police officers arrested 
1140 prostitutes and place more than 200 of 
them on a prison farm during the first nine 
months of 1942. By July 1944, Alsop 
ordered the detainment of all un-escorted 
women "who have no legitimate reason for 
being alone in the streets." Though officers 
did incarcerate many white "Victory Girls," 
they tended to search for salacious behavior 
in black neighborhoods. A poor black 
woman, lacking the economic mobility 
available to her white counterparts, offered a 
much easier target than the white "Rosie the 
Riverters” that community leaders deemed 
essential to the war effort.12 
 
One sheriff created a notorious "vagrancy 
dragnet." Broward County Sheriff Walter 
Clark exhibited malfeasance of office by 
repeatedly seizing African Americans. By 
1944 Clark had established an "enforced 
labor decree" that offered him full discretion 
to hold any person found idle on the streets. 
Without providing a trial or any semblance 
of justice, he gathered blacks from Fort 
Lauderdale's slums and placed them in 
bondage on a farm owned by the mayor of 
nearby Oakland Park. Although state 
officials intended for "work-or-fight" 
regulations to apply to unemployed and 
unproductive adults, a substantial number of 
Clark's victims possessed jobs with stable 
incomes. Some of the men also belonged to 
labor unions. While the Workers' Defense 
League scorned the sheriff's actions and 
demanded an investigation by the Justice 
Department, law enforcement officers who 
admired Clark's successful tactics emulated 
them elsewhere in Florida. By the spring of 
1945, a similar "reign of terror" had 
appeared in Sebring; others soon followed.13 
 
"Jook joints" offered an obvious target. 
These roadside drinking establishments, 
often found in rural areas and frequented by 
farm workers, rankled civic leaders who 
feared that leisurely drinking sapped the 
productivity of black laborers. Any 
expression of freedom -- even if confined to 
a segregated bar in the black community -- 
threatened white social control. A May 1942 
report from the Florida State Defense 
Council blamed a decline in agricultural 
yields on the "vagrancy, laziness, and 
indifference" of blacks who often lived "in 
the Negro quarters of various cities where 
they are not under such strict control and 
have amusements more to their liking." The 
State Agricultural Labor Committee, a 
branch of the Defense Council, believed that 
drinking by farm laborers amounted to 
"sabotage of the war effort." Rural whites 
agreed with this assessment. For example, a 
May 1942 editorial in the Ocala Evening 
Star accused unscrupulous customers in 
black jook joints of committing most of the 
crimes in Marion County. While the 
Defense Council passed a resolution that 
urged the closing of jooks in farming areas, 
municipal authorities often profited from 
keeping their saloons open. Frequent police 
raids in Pensacola, St. Petersburg, and 
elsewhere provided laborers for the white 
community.14 
 
Economic barriers stifled career 
opportunities for urban blacks. When jobs 
became scarce during the Great Depression, 
employers often replaced African Americans 
possessing years of loyal and reliable service 
with less-qualified whites. Edward D. Davis, 
a prominent black Floridian who contributed 
to the postwar civil rights movement, once 
estimated that ninety percent of Tampa’s 
black residents appeared on the relief rolls in 
the 1930s. Even though infusions of federal 
capital invigorated the economy in 
Pensacola by the late 1930s, most 
Afro-Americans in this port city on the 
Panhandle continued to subsist in squalor. 
Jim Crow traditions prevented black 
laborers from fully reaping the benefits of 
the wartime boom. White women secured 
better industrial Jobs than black men, and 
women of color discovered even fewer 
opportunities for economic mobility. A city 
ordinance in Miami discouraged blacks from 
seeking skilled or semi-skilled jobs outside 
of their residential neighborhoods; no 
similar law prevented them from shining 
shoes or cleaning houses in the white com-
munity. When one Tampa firm advertised 
that it desperately needed workers, 
twenty-four black carpenters from 
Columbia, South Carolina, dutifully 
answered this call for laborers. After the 
carpenters arrived in Tampa, however, 
company officials refused to employ them 
because of their race and offered no 
compensation to help them return to South 
Carolina.15 
 
Racism also hindered labor reform. Due to 
the precarious nature of an economy 
historically based on tourism and 
agriculture, Floridians tolerated little 
dissension among workers. When the 
Second World War redefined Florida’s 
economic structure, business executives 
assiduously protected their financial 
interests. They manipulated the prejudices of 
workers to subvert attempts by labor unions 
to organize. Business and community 
leaders refused to forsake their hegemony 
over the state’s developing economy at a 
time when military installations and indus-
trial enterprises proliferated throughout 
Florida. These moguls would not condone 
any overtures that resembled A. Philip 
Randolph’s proposed March on Washington. 
 
Labor organizations faced formidable 
barriers that federal authorities sometimes 
failed to confront. Despite the protests of 
Tampa’s National Maritime Union, ships 
docked in the harbor continued to violate 
contracts by adamantly refusing to hire 
blacks. At citrus plants in Bartow and 
elsewhere, managers distributed brochures 
which implied that a vote for the union 
would inevitably lead to racial equality. On 
the day the National Labor Relations Board 
sponsored a ballot at one company, officials 
sent all black workers home two hours 
before the election. White cronies patrolled 
black neighborhoods and intimidated any 
laborer who tried to return to the plant and 
vote. The Fair Employment Practice 
Committee (FEPQ offered limited assistance 
during the wartime years due to a small 
budget and constraints imposed by its parent 
War Manpower Commission. When 
President Roosevelt restructured and 
strengthened the FEPC in 1943, his actions 
angered Southern politicians who knew that 
blacks filed a majority of the complaints 
investigated by this agency.16 
 
Many whites loathed black civil servants 
and blamed the Roosevelt Administration 
for damaging race relations by allowing 
African Americans to compete for federal 
positions. One Southerner epitomized the 
sentiments of white supremacist Floridians 
by saying to Stetson Kennedy that: "When 
the war’s over we oughta (sic) take all the 
Germans, Japs, Wops, Jews, and every 
nigger who’s worked for the federal 
government and pen’em (sic) all up behind 
electrified barbed wire and keep’em (sic) 
there." Such a statement conflicted with the 
maxims Americans repeated to people 
throughout the world as they waged a "war 
for democracy."17 
 
Despite the throes of Jim Crow, African 
American educators did win an important 
victory during the war years.  The struggle 
to equalize salaries, which began with a suit 
filed by a Brevard County principal in 1938, 
received support from civil rights 
organizations and garnered publicity from 
the national Negro press. Blacks filed 
lawsuits against boards of public instruction 
throughout Florida when school officials 
repeatedly ignored their pleas for fair com-
pensation. While attorneys for the plaintiffs 
never questioned the premise of segregated 
education, they did request that 
administrators offer equal salaries to 
teachers working in black schools. During 
the early 1940s, Thurgood Marshall and 
other talented lawyers from the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People’s (NAACP) Legal Defense Fund 
successfully argued their cases in Florida 
courts. Judicial decisions that compelled 
authorities to disburse wages "without 
discrimination because of race or color" 
encouraged educators in other counties to 
demand reform. Some participants did 
jeopardize their careers. Officials in 
Escambia County fired a principal who led 
the movement among Pensacola’s teachers. 
They justified this action by deeming the 
principal "negligent in authority" because he 
failed to prevent the beating of two white 
vendors who visited the campus, even 
though the incident occurred off school 
grounds. This fight to equalize educational 
salaries served as a skirmish in the larger 
battle to improve educational opportunities 
for blacks.18 
 
The state’s provision for segregated 
education met the needs of white business 
and agrarian interests. Boards of public 
instruction in Florida subjected most blacks 
to inferior curricula, inadequate school 
terms, appalling facilities, and 
poorly-trained teachers. Courses in home 
economics, farming, and industrial arts 
offered at Leon County’s black high school 
prepared graduates to serve as maids, office 
workers, and agricultural laborers. 
Abbreviated school terms hindered 
educational opportunity by emphasizing 
manual labor rather than academic 
enrichment. Officials adjusted the duration 
of classes in many schools so they would not 
conflict with agricultural needs. School 
authorities aggravated this situation by 
refusing to enforce compulsory attendance 
laws. While some rural regions furnished 
only two or three months of instruction each 
year, others failed to provide any facilities 
for black children. Teachers often lacked 
adequate resources and proper training. 
They usually conducted classes with a 
paucity of materials in dilapidated shacks or 
buildings abandoned by whites. Some 
teachers entrusted with the intellectual de-
velopment of black children had never 
completed fifth grade during their 
educational careers.19 
 
Labor reform and economic empowerment 
in the black community required educational 
reform. As a number of college-educated 
blacks entered the teaching profession, they 
joined the Florida State Teachers 
Association – the counterpart to the 
all-white Florida Education Association-and 
established regional chapters that worked 
with the NAACP and other civil rights 
organizations. In 1943, two years after its 
creation, the Palm Beach County Teachers 
Association successfully challenged an edict 
to close black schools "in the interest of the 
national war effort" so children could 
harvest crops. Even though the board of 
public instruction in Palm Beach County 
sought to close black schools, it allowed 
white schools to remain open. Due to their 
efforts, African American teachers reversed 
this order and even persuaded white 
administrators to abolish split school 
terms.20 
 
Moderate improvements in black education 
throughout Florida during the Second World 
War fostered greater reform in the postwar 
years. A progressive method of school 
financing adopted by lawmakers in 1947 
benefited Afro-Americans. This measure 
created a Minimum Foundation Program 
that made no racial distinctions in the 
allocation of school funds to individual 
districts. While black schools received less 
than forty-five percent of the instructional 
dollars provided to white schools in 
1939-1940, that percentage increased to 
nearly seventy-eight percent by 19491950. 
But gross disparities remained. Despite 
Governor Caldwell's insistence on equal 
educational opportunity regardless of race, 
some blacks saw the perpetuation of seg-
regated education as an obstruction to social 
equality. By seeking admission to the law 
school at the University of Florida in 1949, 
Virgil Hawkins openly defied the system of 
Jim Crow schools mandated in Article XII, 
Section 12, of the 1885 state constitution. 
When the landmark 1954 Brown v. Board of 
Education declared segregation uncon-
stitutional, Florida responded by 
constructing numerous black schools and 
junior colleges-and by designating Florida 
Agricultural and Mechanical College as a 
full-fledged university-with the false hope 
that the Court would vacate its decision if 
the state improved separate facilities.21 
 
With the contemptible institution of 
segregation, blacks faced an unyielding 
menace that granted more liberties to 
prisoners of war than to a substantial 
number of American citizens. Although 
Nazi P.O.W.'s incarcerated in Florida did 
provide the state's lumber and agricultural 
industries with cheap labor, they often 
received better treatment in detention camps 
throughout the South than did black soldiers 
in uniform. Amazingly, American military 
personnel even acquiesced to the prejudiced 
demands of German prisoners. Though 
black and white soldiers shared a single 
mess hall at MacDill Field in Tampa, Jim 
Crow customs required that members of 
each race sit on a separate side of the 
building. When German prisoners in the 
kitchen refused to work because American 
soldiers of both races shared the same dining 
center, military authorities appeased the 
P.O.W.'s by removing blacks. Such an 
incident causes one to wonder which 
nation's ideals truly won the war in the short 
term.22 
 
Scholarship has neglected the economic 
contributions of black Floridians during the 
Second World War. Fortunately, newspapers 
such as the Pittsburgh Courier, the Atlanta 
Daily World, and the Baltimore 
Afro-American recounted the heroic efforts 
of blacks on both the home front and the 
battlefield. After the Courier launched its 
"Double V" campaign in early 1942, black 
journalists, intellectuals, and community 
leaders demanded greater social, political, 
and economic empowerment. Although 
veterans returning from the war discovered 
that many of the same perverse Jim Crow 
barriers continued to restrain their mobility, 
they viewed race relations differently: The 
democratic rhetoric of the Second World 
War compelled blacks to choose adept civic 
leaders and to strengthen neighborhood 
institutions. During World War II, one 
writer captured the essence of the emerging 
struggle to refine racial and labor relations 
in this brief passage: "It was as if some 
universal message had come through the 
great mass of Negroes urging them to dream 
new dreams and protest against the old 
order." Victory against fascism instilled new 
life in a struggle over the division of labor 
that had persisted since the days of slavery. 
However, blacks would continue to find 
themselves caught in this cross fire for many 
years after the Allied forces had secured 
military victory.23 
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